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23 
And Justice for All: An Alternative 
Decision to Williams v. Nassau County 
Medical Center to Ameliorate the Harsh 
Impact of New York’s Late Notice of Claim 
Statute on Infant Medical Malpractice 
Plaintiffs 
David A. Mayer* & Christopher McGrath** 
Strict construction of New York State’s late notice of claim 
statute1 has unintentionally thwarted the lofty goals of equal 
access to justice and equal protection under the law through de 
facto economic segregation of infant medical malpractice plain-
tiffs. This inequity has its roots in the simple happenstance of 
an infant or pregnant mother seeking medical treatment at a 
municipal rather than a private hospital, even if the choice of 
hospital is involuntary. The mere selection of a public hospital 
establishes significant obstacles to commencement of a medical 
malpractice action by a parent or guardian on behalf of an in-
jured minor, and it is often likely that the claim will be barred 
forever. Considering the more progressive direction of the New 
York Court of Appeals under Chief Judge Lippman,2 we believe 
it is time to reexamine this issue. 
Millions of people in the United States, principally racial 
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 1. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2007) (amended 2010). 
 2. See William Glaberson, Top Judge Sets Liberal Course for New York, 
N.Y. TIMES, February 18, 2010, at A1 (quoting Professor Vincent M. Bonven-
tre “The message he is sending is he doesn’t mind fighting for a much more 
progressive direction at the court.”); see also Joel Stashenko, Boost in Dissents, 
Criminal Appeals Marks Lippman’s Early Tenure, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 2010, at 
1 (“‘I believe the Court today is not about labels,’ Judge Lippman said. ‘It is 
very much about the law and applying the law to individual cases. It is a 
commonsense Court.’”). 
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and ethnic minorities, face barriers to quality health care.3 New 
York’s poor and uninsured are segregated into separate and 
unequal4 institutions.5 Uninsured and Medicaid patients ac-
count for 4% of hospital discharges at select private hospitals, 
as opposed to nearly 90% at some public facilities.6 This two-
tiered system results in economically disadvantaged patients 
being relegated to the “clinic” model of care in which rotating 
groups of doctors-in-training lack the coordination of care that 
patients in private hospitals expect from their personal attend-
ing physician.7 
Critics of this system of medical apartheid have decried the 
negative effects of differential care on health outcomes.8 For 
example, a study measuring the rates of primary cesarean sec-
tions (C-sections) among women in Los Angeles County, Cali-
fornia found that, independent of maternal indices for emer-
gent delivery of a child such as fetal distress, rates varied 
directly with the socioeconomic status of the mother.9 The rate 
of C-sections among women with median family incomes of 
more than $30,000 per annum is 22.9% as compared to 13.2% 
                                                          
 3. Brian Smedley et al., Identifying and Evaluating Equity Provisions in 
State Health Care Reform, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Apr. 23, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-
Reports/2008/Apr/Identifying-and-Evaluating-Equity-Provisions-in-State-
Health-Care-Reform.aspx (noting that in the United States minorities, immi-
grants, and non-English speakers face barriers to obtaining good health care). 
 4. A disparaging reference to the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), arguably one of 
the most shameful decisions ever issued by the United States Supreme Court. 
 5. See Arthur Schatzkin, Variation in Inpatient Racial Composition 
Among Acute-Care Hospitals in New York State, 20 SOC. SCI. & MED. 371, 376 
(1985). 
 6. SPARCS 2001 Annual Report Table 9(I), N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, (last visited Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/statistics/sparcs/annual/t2001_09.htm. 
 7. See Neil Calman et al., Separate and Unequal Care in New York City, 
9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 105, 111 (2006). 
 8. See id. at 105; see also Christina Frangou, Data Confirm Effect of In-
surance on Surgical Outcomes, 37:7 GEN. SURGERY NEWS 1 (2010) (“[The] 
study leaves no doubt that the patients’ insurance status is inextricably linked 
to in-hospital mortality and complications after major surgery . . . patients 
covered by Medicaid incurred a 97% increased risk for dying while in the hos-
pital, and uninsured patients had a 74% increase in risk compared with pri-
vately insured patients.”). 
 9. Jeffrey B. Gould et al., Socioeconomic Differences in Rates of Cesarean 
Section, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED 233, 237 (1989). 
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among families with median incomes under $11,000.10 The 
rates of C-sections were highest for non-Hispanic whites and 
lowest for blacks and Mexican Americans.11 In one study based 
on data from California hospitals, women with private insur-
ance had the highest C-section rates (29.1%).12 Successively 
lower rates were found for patients with public insurance 
(22.9%), self-pay (19.3%), and indigent services (15.6%).13 The 
danger of financial disincentives to public hospitals’ ability to 
deliver quality perinatal care is palpable.14 
It is unfortunate enough that patients are segregated into 
separate and unequal forms of care, leading to disparate 
healthcare outcomes.15 All the more unsettling, however, is 
that the New York Legislature and Judiciary also unintention-
ally subject victims of this system of medical apartheid to sepa-
rate and unequal access to the court system for compensation 
for their injuries. The gravamen of this two-tiered de facto con-
struct is the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its modern 
vestige, the notice of claim requirement. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, deeply rooted in com-
mon law and recognized since feudal times, was an absolute 
bar to actions and assignments of liability against the sove-
reign.16 Two separate British common law fictions provided ra-
tionales for this absolute immunity. The first held that, even 
when the sovereign violated a private right, it was presumed 
that he was deceived into so doing—a form of fraudulent pro-
curement preventing any remedy against the crown.17 The 
second held that the sovereign, having conquered the realm or 
                                                          
 10. Id. at 234 tbl.1. 
 11. Id. at 236. 
 12. Randall Stafford, Cesarean Section Use and Source of Payment: An 
Analysis of California Hospital Discharge Abstracts, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
313, 313 (1990). 
 13. Id. at 314 tbl.1. 
 14. See id. at 315 (noting that insurance claim data for the western Unit-
ed States shows that cesarean sections were 84% more costly than vaginal de-
liveries—$5000 versus $2720). In addition to financial disincentives, access to 
technology, physician work schedules, presence of trainee resident doctors, pa-
tient socioeconomic status, and medical malpractice concerns contribute to ob-
served payor differences. Id. 
 15. See Calman et al., supra note 7, at 105. 
 16. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LAW: SELECTIONS 
FROM BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 95 (Gareth 
Jones ed., 1973) (“Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the 
king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him.”). 
 17. Id. at 98. 
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acquired his throne by primogeniture, was an omnipotent ruler 
who, as the source of all law, could not possibly commit an il-
legal act.18 These archaic paradigms were later transplanted in-
to American jurisprudence and continue to exist, albeit in mod-
ified form, due to the belief that the government must 
discharge its duties and responsibilities in as unencumbered a 
manner as is constitutionally permissible.19 For example, the 
United States government retained immunity from tort liabili-
ty, absent its express consent to be sued, until a limited waiver 
was provided by the relatively recent passage of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act in 1946.20 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was alive and well in 
New York State until the Legislature enacted the Court of 
Claims Act in 1929.21 For the first time, New York State could 
be sued in the Court of Claims for common law torts. This 
waiver of sovereign immunity extended to governmental subdi-
visions, as well. Subsequent statutes have defined both the 
manner in which these subdivisions may be sued and the 
unique defenses that immunize the government from tort lia-
bility in certain situations.22 New York has been reluctant to 
allow the waiver of sovereign immunity to operate in absolute 
terms. Statutory immunity defenses are an effort to balance the 
competing policy concerns of the private rights of injured par-
ties who would otherwise be left without any recourse against 
necessary freedom of governmental action.23 Enacted in 1945, 
the notice of claim requirement of New York General Municipal 
Law § 50-e is such a provision.24 Generally, such limitations are 
                                                          
 18. See id.; see also Rex v. Kempe, 1 Lord Raym 49, 52 (1676) (ruling that 
if the King attempts to grant a title but makes a legal mistake in the process 
the grant is still valid); Gledstanes v. Earl of Sandwich, 4 Man. & G. 995, 
1029–30 (1842) (confirming that if a King makes a grant, but is mistaken as to 
the law, that grant is still valid). 
 19. United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878) (noting that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United Kingdom, later adopted into the 
U.S. Constitution, was founded on the belief that the sovereign and his agents 
could better perform their duties free from the distraction of suits being 
brought against them.). 
 20. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2006); Wilcox v. United States, 
117 F.Supp. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
 21. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 9 (McKinney 2009). 
 22. See e.g., Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (N.Y. 
1982). 
 23. See Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1144 (N.Y. 1996). 
 24. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2009). 
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strictly construed, since waiver of sovereign immunity is in de-
rogation of common law doctrine.25 
Before a tort claim can proceed against a public corpora-
tion, city, county, town, village, or fire or school district in New 
York, a notice of claim pursuant to § 50-e must be served with-
in ninety days of the date of accrual of the tort.26 This require-
ment is intended to allow the public entity the opportunity to 
investigate and obtain evidence promptly before claims become 
stale and the memory or availability of witnesses is compro-
mised.27 Prior to 1976, courts had no general discretion to allow 
late service of a notice of claim, and the grounds upon which 
late service might be granted were narrowly construed. Profes-
sor David Siegel notes that the case annotations in McKinney’s 
§ 50-e were “literally a graveyard of meritorious claims” barred 
by failure to fulfill the condition precedent.28 The landscape 
changed dramatically with the 1976 amendment to § 50-e, 
which expanded judicial discretion to allow a late notice of 
claim so long as service took place before the statute of limita-
tions had run, subject to applicable tolls and extensions.29 Sta-
tutory factors a court is expressly empowered to consider in-
clude whether the defendant had actual knowledge of the facts 
constituting the claim within ninety days or a reasonable time 
thereafter, whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced 
by the delay, the disability of infancy, and all other relevant 
facts and circumstances.30 
Academics have argued that it is inherently unreasonable 
to require infant-plaintiffs to file a timely notice of claim as a 
precondition to suit against a local governmental entity, as it 
conditions exercise of their legal rights upon an act which the 
minor is legally, physically, or intellectually incapable of per-
forming.31 Furthermore, it is poor public policy to require in-
                                                          
 25. See Sharapata, 437 N.E.2d at 1106. 
 26. See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 36 (4th ed. 2005); see also 
State v. Waverly Cent. Sch. Dist., 280 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967). 
 27. See SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 36; Waverley Cent. Sch. Dist., 280 
N.Y.S.2d at 507. 
 28. SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 37. 
 29. The Amendment was drafted by Professor Paul S. Graziano at the re-
quest of the N.Y. State Judicial Conference. See Paul S. Graziano, Recommen-
dations Relating to Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law and Related 
Statutes, in THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND THE OFFICE OF COURT 
ADMINISTRATION TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 367–70 (1976). 
 30. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(5) (McKinney 2009). 
 31. See Jennifer M. Chow, Civil Practice Law and Rules, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. 
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fant-plaintiffs to rely on their parents or guardians whose ig-
norance of the law or disinterest may deprive the minor of the 
right to pursue their claim.32 Although courts have the specific 
statutory discretion to allow the filing of a late notice of claim, 
New York appellate courts have stubbornly refused over the 
last five years to follow the Legislature’s implicit direction in 
permitting these claims to be filed and the law suits to pro-
ceed.33 
A uniquely vulnerable sub-class of infant-plaintiffs is 
brain-damaged newborn victims of obstetrical negligence, 
whose full extent of injury may not be evident until develop-
mental milestones are reached years later. Such an infant-
appellant eventually appeared before the New York Court of 
Appeals in 2006, requesting discretionary leave to file a late no-
tice of claim against a county hospital.34 The medical records, 
bolstered by expert interpretation, were replete with egregious 
disregard of the signs of mounting fetal distress and clear indi-
cations to deliver the baby by emergency C-section. These 
records arguably showed that the County had actual knowledge 
of the facts constituting the claim. However, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to deny the ap-
plication, forever barring the minor’s claim.35 The Court ex-
pressly stated that medical records, without more, do not fulfill 
the notice requirement of § 50-e.36 
The authors believe that the New York Court of Appeals 
was wrong, both as a matter of law and of public policy. The 
flawed reasoning from the unfortunate 2006 decision has been 
perpetuated in a line of subsequent cases, thus denying equally 
vulnerable victims of neonatal negligence their day in court.37 
We therefore present the following alternative decision: 
                                                          
REV. 675, 679–680 (1995). 
 32. See Scott A. DeVries, Medical Malpractice Acts’ Statutes of Limitation 
as they Apply to Minors: Are they Proper?, 28 IND. L. REV. 413, 423 (1995). 
 33. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez v. City of N.Y., 876 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140–41 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Rowe v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 871 N.Y.S.2d 330, 
332 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Bucknor v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 844 
N.Y.S.2d 100, 102–03 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Rios v. Westchester County 
Healthcare Corp., 821 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 34. Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 847 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 2006). 
 35. Id. at 1158. 
 36. Id. at 1157. 
 37. See Gonzalez, 876 N.Y.S.2d at 140–41; Rowe, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 332; 
Bucknor, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 102–03; Rios, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 103–04. 
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*  *  * 
New York Court of Appeals 
 
TYMEIK WILLIAMS, an Infant by His Mother and Natu-
ral Guardian, Lekesha Fowler, 
APPELLANT 
v. 
NASSAU COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER, et al., 
RESPONDENTS 
 
[April 4, 2006] 
 
This case requires us to consider General Municipal Law § 
50-e (5) in the context of an application by the mother of an in-
fant claimant for leave to serve a notice of claim nearly ten 
years after alleged obstetrical negligence by Nassau County 
Medical Center left the infant with epilepsy and developmental 
disabilities. Exercising its discretion, the Nassau County Su-
preme Court granted leave to serve the late notice. The Appel-
late Division, however, reversed “on the law and as a matter of 
discretion.” Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 786 N.Y.S.2d 
207, 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
Abuse of discretion, as a matter of law, either shocks one’s 
sense of fairness or shocks the judicial conscience. Kreisler v. 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 812 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (N.Y. 2004). It is 
an abuse of a lower court’s discretion if its judgment is found to 
be “grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal or unsupported by 
the evidence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (9th ed. 2009). We 
find that the Appellate Division abused its discretion, and re-
verse on the law. Accordingly, Appellant’s motion for leave to 
serve late notice of claim is granted, and we remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
In General Municipal Law § 50-e, the Legislature made 
serving a notice of claim a condition precedent to bringing suit 
against a public corporation. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e (1)(a) 
(McKinney 2007) (amended 2010). Section 50-e(1) requires the 
notice to be served within ninety days after the claim accrues. 
Id. The notice of claim statute gave courts discretion to extend 
this time and provided criteria for determining when to grant 
extensions. Late service of an original notice of claim is a nulli-
ty if made without leave of court. See Pierre v. City of New 
York, 804 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). In Cohen v. 
Pearl River Union Free School District, 414 N.E.2d 639, 645 
121_MAYER.DOCX 4/4/2011  8:07 AM 
30 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
(N.Y. 1980), this court held that the time to apply for leave to 
file a late notice of claim was the same as the one year ninety 
day limitation period for bringing a tort action against a muni-
cipality. 
In Cohen, we also considered “whether the period during 
which a court may grant an extension of time within which to 
serve notice of claim is tolled during the infancy of the claimant 
in accordance with C.P.L.R. 208.” Id. at 643. Because the limi-
tation period for suing a municipal corporation is tolled during 
infancy, id. at 641, and since the time in which to seek leave to 
file a late notice of claim is expressly coextensive with that li-
mitation period, id., this court held that the time to apply for 
leave to file a late notice of claim is also tolled during the plain-
tiff’s minority. See id. at 644–45. However, pursuant to 
C.P.L.R. 208, if a person entitled to commence a medical mal-
practice action is under the disability of infancy at the time of 
accrual, the claimant is entitled to an infancy toll not to exceed 
ten years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 2007). This ten-year 
period represents the outer time limit during which the medical 
malpractice infant plaintiff must apply for leave to file a late 
notice of claim or find his action barred. This potential defect is 
jurisdictional since a court lacks power to authorize service of 
late notice after the time within which to commence action has 
expired. In re Turner v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 663 N.Y.S.2d 254, 
255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
I. 
General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) gives lower courts broad 
discretion to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim. Cf. He-
nriques v. City of New York, 803 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005); Seymour v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 
N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Little v. Nassau 
Health Care Corp., 790 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005). 
Upon application, the court, in its discretion, may extend the time to 
serve a notice of claim specified in paragraph (a) of subdivision one. 
The extension shall not exceed the time limited for the commence-
ment of an action by the claimant against the public corporation. In 
determining whether to grant the extension, the court shall consider, 
in particular, whether the public corporation or its attorney or its in-
surance carrier acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts con-
stituting the claim within the time specified in subdivision one or 
within a reasonable time thereafter. The court shall also consider all 
other relevant facts and circumstances, including: whether the clai-
mant was an infant, or mentally or physically incapacitated, or died 
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before the time limited for service of the notice of claim; whether the 
claimant failed to serve a timely notice of claim by reason of his justi-
fiable reliance upon settlement representations made by an autho-
rized representative of the public corporation or its insurance carrier; 
whether the claimant in serving a notice of claim made an excusable 
error concerning the identity of the public corporation against which 
the claim should be asserted; and whether the delay in serving the 
notice of claim substantially prejudiced the public corporation in 
maintaining its defense on the merits. 
  An application for leave to serve a late notice shall not be denied 
on the ground that it was made after commencement of an action 
against the public corporation. 
Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(5) (McKinney 2007). 
The statute directs courts to consider, in particular, 
whether within ninety days, or a reasonable time thereafter, 
the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the facts 
underlying the claim. Palazzo v. City of New York, 444 F. Supp. 
1089, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The statute, as currently worded, 
appears to elevate the “actual knowledge” factor to a higher 
level of significance. Id. In determining whether to grant an ex-
tension, the lower court must also consider all other relevant 
facts and circumstances, including infancy and substantial pre-
judice to the municipality’s ability to defend the claim. N.Y. 
Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(5) (McKinney 2007). 
If a lower court does not abuse its discretion in granting 
leave to serve a late notice, its decision should not be disturbed 
on appeal. See Colantuono v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 399 
N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). A court is not limited to the 
precise factors recited in the statute. Beary v. City of Rye, 377 
N.E.2d 453, 455, 457 (N.Y. 1978). However, it is an abuse of 
discretion for a court to deny such an application without ap-
propriate consideration of the statutory factors. See Chmie-
lewski v. City of New York, 468 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1983). It is also an abuse of discretion to deny such an applica-
tion where the public corporation had actual knowledge of the 
essential facts constituting the claim, providing the delay did 
not result in prejudice to the municipality’s ability to defend on 
the merits. Caminero v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 800 
N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 
II. 
A. 
The medical records of Nassau County Medical Center 
show that Lekesha Fowler was admitted to the labor and deli-
very floor at approximately 1:00 a.m. on September 10, 1993. 
She ruptured her membranes and experienced strong uterine 
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contractions about every two minutes. Vaginal exam showed 
the baby was at minus two station in the pelvis.38 The admit-
ting physician’s assessment was “an intrauterine pregnancy at 
term in active labor,” awaiting a vaginal delivery. Pl.-
Appellant’s Br. 14–15, A12–13, A22–23. The Chief Resident 
saw the patient at 5:15 a.m. Contractions continued every two 
to four minutes. The baby remained wedged at minus two sta-
tion. Impression was dysfunctional labor. The plan was possible 
pitocin augmentation. Since the uterine contractions remained 
strong, the failure to progress could only be due to cephalopel-
vic disproportion — the fetal head was too large to pass safely 
through the mother’s pelvis. Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 15–16, A13–14. 
Dr. Robert Shaiman, Appellant’s medical expert, explains the 
parameters of pitocin use in the William’s delivery: 
The only assessment of the pelvis performed was a clinical assess-
ment in which the pelvis was described as “adequate with the spines 
not prominent and a hollow sacrum . . . [This assessment was inade-
quate to determine whether it was inappropriate to use pitocin, which 
is a powerful drug.] Prior to using such medication, it is absolutely es-
sential for the physician to establish that the fetal head can safely fit 
through the bony pelvis, otherwise the combination of cephalopelvic 
disproportion and greatly increased contractions will force the fetal 
head through an inadequate pelvis and damage the fetal brain . . . . 
[A]ssessment would include but not be limited to an ultrasound ex-
amination and pelvimetry. 
Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 15–16, A13-14. 
At 6:40 a.m., signs of fetal distress first appeared. The fetal 
heart rate was described as non-reactive and non-reassuring. 
At 7:30 a.m., despite the adverse effect on the fetus, the pitocin 
infusion was increased to two milliunits per minute. Pl.-
Appellant’s Br. 16–17, A26. Between 8:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., 
decelerations of the fetal heart rate with a late component were 
ominous signs that the fetal head was being dangerously com-
pressed into the narrow pelvis. Instead of recognizing the need 
to urgently deliver the baby by caesarean section, physicians 
merely increased the pitocin administration at a steady rate up 
to eight milliunits per minute, causing further fetal deteriora-
                                                          
 38. The mechanism of delivering a child involves the passage of the baby 
through the mother’s pelvis. Traditionally, generations of obstetricians have 
used a reference called “station.” This measurement tells how far down the 
head of the baby has descended towards delivery. The station is based on the 
relation of the fetal head to two bony prominences called the ischial spines 
that mark the mid-pelvis (where the baby is halfway out). “Minus 2 station” 
means two cm. above the ischial spines. See DANFORTH’S OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 22–42 (James R. Scott et al. eds., 9th ed. 2003). 
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tion. The nurses notified Dr. Tom at 10:15 a.m. and Dr. Dray at 
11:30 a.m. about the decelerations in fetal heart rate. At 12:15 
p.m., the pitocin was reduced from eight to five milliunits. Pl.-
Appellant’s Br. 17–18, A14–16, A30. Signs of fetal distress con-
tinued as evidenced by a nonreactive fetal heart rate with vari-
able decelerations. Pitocin was not discontinued until 2:30 p.m. 
Fetal distress was further evidenced by the baby’s heart rate 
climbing from a baseline of 130–160 at 3:45 p.m. to 200 at 4:15 
p.m. This, together with arrest of progression of labor, meant 
that immediate caesarean section was necessary to avoid fetal 
hypoxia—lack of oxygen and blood flow to the brain and vital 
organs. No caesarian section was forthcoming. Pl.-Appellant’s 
Br. 18–19, A16–17. 
In an attempt to deliver Tymeik Williams vaginally, a va-
cuum device was twice placed on his head to try to pull him 
out—failing each time. Then, forceps were used to pull his head 
out, lacerating his face. He was born with forceps marks on his 
head and a fractured clavicle. Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 19, A17. Dr. 
Shaiman, Appellant’s medical expert, described the traumatic 
birth following hours of dystocia (abnormal labor) from the ce-
phalopelvic disproportion and pitocin augmented contractions: 
The mother was unable to deliver the child by normal vaginal deli-
very due to dystocia, which is precisely why a cesarean section was 
indicated. In order to deliver this infant, two separate vacuum extrac-
tions were attempted and failed at 5:00 p.m. and 5:15 p.m. The va-
cuum extraction is undertaken by applying a vacuum cup to the pre-
senting part, in this case the fetal head, to deliver the infant. Here, it 
is plain that the presenting part was so tightly wedged in the birth 
canal that the vacuum delivery was impossible and traumatic. Even-
tually, vaginal delivery was traumatically completed by the applica-
tion of forceps to pull the newborn out, resulting in a third degree la-
ceration. 
Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 19, A17. 
Pediatricians were called to the delivery room for fetal dis-
tress. Despite tremors and other signs of newborn injury, the 
Apgar scores39 (an index to evaluate the condition of a newborn 
infant, with ten being a perfect score) were eight and nine, 
above the level requiring resuscitation. Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 20, 
A17–18. Dr. Shaiman explained how these relatively high 
scores are not inconsistent with the fetal brain injury: 
In this case, the excessive pressure applied to the top of the infant’s 
head as it is forced through the inadequate pelvis, propelled by exces-
sive amounts of pitocin, caused an ischemia wherein the blood was 
                                                          
 39. Id. at 22–42. 
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forced out of the brain. This results in a portion of the brain receiving 
a drastically reduced level of adequately oxygenated blood while the 
brain stem continues to receive adequate levels of adequately oxyge-
nated blood. 
Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 20, A17–18. 
Although a resident’s note documents that the child suf-
fered significant trauma, “[i]ncredibly, notwithstanding the 
hours of pitocin, the two failed vacuum extractions, the necessi-
ty of forceps, and the clear evidence of physical trauma to the 
infant, including a fractured clavicle, the physician’s attesta-
tion form characterized the birth as a ‘vaginal delivery without 
complicating diagnosis.’” Id. 
Plaintiff suffers from seizures and a developmental cogni-
tive disorder. Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 21. Respondents argue that 
Plaintiff’s disability was not apparent until the age of one or 
two. Electroencephalogram (EEG), used to test brain waves, 
was normal in 1995, but became abnormal in 1998 and 1999. 
Def.-Resp’t’s Br. 6. 
While grand mal seizures were apparently first noted at approximate-
ly one year of age . . . it is extremely significant that the infant began 
to exhibit neonatal tremors within hours of birth despite serial [glu-
cose levels] within normal limits . . . . [The nurse’s] note documents 
not only tremors but also molding of the head, further indicia of the 
excessive pressure exerted on the fetal head during delivery. Further 
an MRI scan of his brain performed on 4/8/99 found patchy periven-
tricular white matter . . . consistent with an asphyxic brain injury . . . 
. 
Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 21, A18–19 (underlining omitted). 
On October 11, 1999, an audiologist and speech pathologist 
found the infant claimant to be significantly delayed in speech 
and language development. Def.-Resp’t’s Br. 6. Mrs. Fowler 
supplied an affidavit attesting to her son’s injuries: 
My son has a seizure disorder, which is controlled by antiseizure me-
dications. He is intellectually and developmentally delayed. He at-
tends a special education school . . . . Although he is just short of ten 
years of age, I am advised that he functions at the level of a five year 
old. He can only read simple three letter words. He receives speech 
therapy three times a week and occupational therapy twice a week. I 
am advised that his seizures and intellectual and developmental 
problems are a result of brain injury which occurred during the labor 
and delivery process. He also suffered an injury to his penis due to a 
negligently performed circumcision at the Nassau County Medical 
Center.40 
                                                          
 40. A “Peds Procedure Note,” dated 9/15/93, states in pertinent part: “dur-
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Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 21–22, A53a–53b. 
B. 
On September 4, 2003, almost ten years following his birth, 
Appellant mailed a notice of claim pursuant to § 50-e(5) to Nas-
sau County and the hospital. The notice of claim alleged that 
Nassau County Medical Center performed: 
[A] contraindicated pitocin augmentation and delivery by vacuum ex-
traction and forceps, which care caused injury to the brain of the in-
fant claimant, Tymeik Williams, and a fracture of his left clavicle. 
Thereafter, during the neonatal and pediatric care, the claimant . . .  
suffered injury to his penis as a result of a negligently performed cir-
cumcision in which excessive amounts of skin were removed ventrally 
and dorsally. . . . The infant claimant . . . suffered brain damage as a 
result of birth trauma and hypoxia resulting in cognitive deficits, de-
velopmental delays, speech delays, fetal distress, psychomotor delays 
and a seizure disorder. 
Def.-Resp’t’s Br. 6–7. 
Although Appellant commenced this action by moving to 
have the notice of claim deemed timely filed nunc pro tunc, the 
Nassau County Supreme Court deemed it a motion for an order 
granting leave to file a late notice of claim. Williams v. Nassau 
County Med. Ctr., 786 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) 
(holding that the order to grant “the Plaintiff’s motion, in effect, 
for leave to serve a late notice of claim” is reversed) (emphasis 
added). By short order form dated January 9, 2004, Justice An-
thony Parga held that Plaintiff’s failure to show a nexus be-
tween infancy and the delay in filing the late notice, and his 
failure to offer a reasonable excuse for the ten-year delay in 
making the instant application, were “not necessarily fatal 
when weighed against the factors of notice and the lack of pre-
judice to the municipality . . . .” See Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 7, A4; 
Medley v. Chicon, 761 N.Y.S.2d 666, 668 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
The Supreme Court determined that the County had received 
timely actual notice of the facts constituting the claim: 
The Second Department has distinguished medical malpractice cases 
from other types of negligence actions, and has “often” permitted “the 
service of a late notice of claim . . . in a medical malpractice action re-
lating to the care and treatment of a patient because the hospital is in 
possession of the patient’s medical records and thus has actual notice 
of the underlying facts of the claim . . . . 
Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 7, A4. 
                                                          
ing [circumcision] procedure excessive skin was cut both ventrally and dorsal-
ly . . . Mother explained. Urosurgery and Plastic Surgery called.” Pl.-
Appellant’s Br. A41. 
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As discovery proceeded in the action pending below, the 
County appealed to the Appellate Division. In a Decision and 
Order dated December 6, 2004, the Second Department re-
versed the Nassau County Supreme Court and denied the mo-
tion. Williams, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 208. The Appellate Division 
agreed with the trial court that Plaintiff had not established 
that the delay in seeking leave to serve the late notice was 
caused by his infancy and that the mother’s ignorance that 
medical malpractice had caused her son’s brain injury and her 
lack of awareness of the notice of claim requirement were un-
reasonable excuses. Id. at 209. The Appellate Division then 
held that defendant’s possession of medical records did not give 
the defendants timely, actual knowledge of the claim and that 
plaintiffs had failed to show that the delay did not prejudice the 
defendants: 
[W]e are not persuaded that the defendants had actual knowledge of 
the claim within the requisite 90-day period, or within a reasonable 
time thereafter. Although it is true they were in possession of the per-
tinent medical records, that did not establish that they had actual no-
tice of the specific claim. Finally, the plaintiff failed to establish that 
the defendants would not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining 
their defense on the merits as a result of the lengthy delay in moving, 
in effect, for leave to serve a late notice of claim. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Following the Appellate Division’s decision, the County 
moved in Supreme Court to dismiss the complaint. Appellant 
cross-moved for leave to renew based on “evidence that came 
into existence” after the Supreme Court’s January 9, 2004 Or-
der. The new evidence, the fruit of normal discovery in the ac-
tion pending below, consisted of depositions of three physicians 
present at Appellant’s birth, as well as depositions of family 
members refuting the defense’s assertion of a family history of 
seizure disorder. Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 11. Appellant cited 
D’Alessandro v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 636 N.E.2d 1382, 
1383 (N.Y. 1991), where the court held that in determining 
whether a mistake or omission in a notice of claim prejudiced a 
public corporation in investigating the claim, the court may 
consider evidence outside the four corners of the notice of 
claim). In an order (“Second Supreme Court Order”) dated 
March 11, 2005, the Supreme Court denied Appellant’s motion 
for renewal and granted the County’s motion to dismiss. On 
March 30, 2005, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this 
second order. Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 11–12. We hear the case be-
fore us based on our June 30, 2005 grant of permission to ap-
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peal. Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 801 N.Y.S.2d 251, 
252 (N.Y. 2005). 
III. 
The courts have long recognized that medical records pro-
vide an extensive “paper trail” preserving the essential facts of 
a patient’s care and treatment. Quiroz v. City of New York, 546 
N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Kavanaugh v. Mem’l Hosp. 
& Nursing Home, 511 N.Y.S.2d 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
Nonetheless, in reviewing such records, courts should be realis-
tic, as is the Legislature, in recognizing institutional reluctance 
to confess fault or assign blame that could lead to liability. This 
reluctance extends to documentation by hospital staff members 
in records obtainable by patients and their attorneys. N.Y. 
Educ. Law § 6527(3) (McKinney 2006); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 
2805-m (McKinney 2006); Logue v. Velez, 699 N.E.2d 365, 367–
68 (N.Y. 1998). Whether a municipal hospital’s medical records 
provide actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting a 
medical malpractice claim is the overarching concern of a court 
deciding an application to file a late notice of claim. The 
mandate of § 50-e(5) is specific and direct in this regard: “In de-
termining whether to grant the extension, the court shall con-
sider, in particular, whether the public corporation . . . acquired 
actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim 
within the time specified in subdivision one or within a reason-
able time thereafter.” Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(5). This Court fur-
ther recognizes that the convenient or ready means of acquiring 
knowledge is the legal equivalent of knowledge. 
In order to decide what the essential facts of such a claim 
are, a court needs some basic medical interpretation of the hos-
pital records. An expert affidavit has been found essential in 
proving the actual knowledge requirement of § 50-e(5): 
Although it was not legally necessary that an application for leave to 
file a late notice of claim be accompanied by a C.P.L.R. 3012-a affida-
vit of merit, absent a medical opinion that respondent’s own records 
documented clinical signs that petitioner was developing hydrocepha-
lus, petitioner would have been unable to establish that respondent 
acquired knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim with-
in a reasonable time following the accrual of the cause of action. 
McLaughlin ex rel. McLaughlin v. County of Albany, 685 
N.Y.S.2d 846, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
Expert medical testimony is even necessary to explain to 
the trier of fact what is common knowledge among physicians. 
States v. Lourdes Hosp., 792 N.E.2d 151, 154 (N.Y. 2003). The 
only recognized exception arises in those few cases involving 
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matters within the ordinary knowledge and experience of lay-
persons. Mosberg v. Elahi, 605 N.E.2d 353, 354 (N.Y. 1992) 
(dismissing allegation of miscarriage from improper removal of 
intrauterine contraceptive device due to plaintiff’s failure to of-
fer affidavit of merit from medical expert); Fiore v. Galang, 478 
N.E.2d 188 (N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment to defen-
dants in a failure to diagnose cancer claim: “[E]xcept as to mat-
ters within the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, 
in a medical malpractice action, expert medical opinion evi-
dence is required to demonstrate merit”); Ramirez v. County of 
Nassau, 787 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (N. Y. App. Div. 2004) (granting 
infant plaintiff leave to serve late notice of claim for brain 
damage during delivery upon sufficiency of medical expert affi-
davit that medical records gave defendants actual knowledge of 
the facts constituting the claim). 
Here, interpretation of Tymeik Williams’ complex neonatal 
obstetrical records clearly lies outside of a layperson’s know-
ledge and experience. Appellant’s expert Dr. Shaiman, a duly 
licensed physician in the State of New York, affirms that: “[t]he 
departures from good and accepted standards of medical care in 
this case and the results of said departures are fully preserved 
and documented in the underlying medical records.” Pl.-
Appellant’s Br. A14. Respondent submits no expert affirmation 
in opposition, but avers that the medical records of Appellant’s 
birth do not provide actual knowledge of the essential facts 
constituting the claim. This conclusion is based on two asser-
tions: first, that Dr. Shaiman has merely drawn his own infe-
rences from the records, which can be challenged and, second, 
that Dr. Shaiman is not an obstetrician but is, in fact, an in-
ternist not board certified in any specialty. Def.-Resp’t’s Br. 28. 
Here, since Respondent has not proffered any expert medical 
opinion of its own despite ample opportunity to do so, we find 
this non-expert attack of counsel to be unavailing. 
The County argues that, pursuant to § 50-e(5), the medical 
records must show the impact of the malpractice on the plain-
tiff and that the injury described must be related to the injury 
set forth in the notice of claim. Respondent further asserts: 
“While it may be that the County had knowledge of the facts of 
the mother and infant’s treatment and condition, it is far dif-
ferent to conclude that it had knowledge of the specific claims 
being alleged; that is, failure to perform a caesarian section and 
improperly administering pitocin.” Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 38, A57 
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(arguing against the Second Department’s holding, based on  In 
re Sica v. Bd. of Educ., 640 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996); Caruso v. County of Westchester, 633 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Shapiro v. County of Nassau, 616 
N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Falon v. County of 
Westchester, 584 N.Y.S.2d 322, 323 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), that 
the municipality had notice or knowledge of the specific claim) 
(underlining omitted). Furthermore, in Williams, the Second 
Department relied upon Sica and Shapiro in concluding that 
Defendants did not have actual knowledge of the claim within 
ninety days or a reasonable time thereafter. Although they pos-
sessed the medical records, “[t]he municipality must have no-
tice or knowledge of the specific claim and not general know-
ledge that a wrong has been committed.” Shapiro, 786 N.Y.S.2d 
at 208. 
While we agree that mere knowledge of a “general wrong” 
is insufficient for purposes of the statute, the Second Depart-
ment applied the wrong legal standard by holding that § 50-e(5) 
requires inquiry into whether the public corporation acquired 
knowledge of the specific claim instead of knowledge of the es-
sential facts constituting the claim. This “notice of the specific 
claim” standard used by the Second Department in this and 
other cases, see Seymour v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 
N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), goes far beyond the 
statutory mandate of § 50-e(5). It is tantamount to a rule that a 
hospital’s records must alert the municipality to the legal 
theory of the plaintiff’s case, not just to the essential facts un-
derlying the claim. Moreover, the County’s argument ignores 
the fact that it is common for the impact of negligent medical 
care on a patient to become manifest only after a substantial 
period of time has elapsed. This is especially so for cerebral 
palsy and mental retardation, which often cannot be diagnosed 
until future developmental milestones are reached. 
Respondent cites four cases where, admittedly, medical 
records did impart actual knowledge to the defendant munici-
pality. In the first, Caminero v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 
800 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), a remarkable notation 
in the hospital records stated that the baby had suffered a “mi-
sadventure during medical care.” Id. at 174. The infant lost a 
toe when a pulse oxygen monitor was wrapped too tightly 
around her foot. Caminero is an exceptional case where no ex-
pert testimony was needed to demonstrate the departures. 
Should Respondent’s argument be accepted, the only instances 
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in which medical records give actual knowledge to the munici-
pality are those in which the malpractice is within the under-
standing of a layperson—such as amputation of the wrong leg. 
We find this interpretation unduly restrictive. 
Respondents cites three other cases which all used expert 
medical interpretation of the records to conclude that the ac-
tual knowledge prong of § 50-e(5) had been met: Ramirez v. 
County of Nassau, 787 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Med-
ley v. Cichon, 761 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); and In 
re. Tomlinson v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 593 
N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). All three actions concerned 
allegations similar to those in the case before us—fetal brain 
damage during delivery due to obstetrical negligent failure to 
perform a caesarian section in the face of arrested labor and 
signs of fetal distress. Here, the County attempts to distinguish 
Williams by asserting that other factors besides obstetrical 
malfeasance are responsible for appellant’s cognitive deficits 
and seizures. We find that this line of argument goes more to 
the ultimate merits of the case than to the adequacy of the no-
tice requirement. 
In the context of medical malpractice, while mere posses-
sion of medical records alone may be insufficient to provide ac-
tual knowledge of the facts constituting a claim, due to institu-
tional reluctance to document deviations from standard of care, 
the actual knowledge requirement of § 50-e(5) should be liberal-
ly construed. In the instant case, the medical records necessary 
to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim were at 
all times within the municipal corporation’s control. We find 
that Respondent’s alleged lack of knowledge is without merit 
and that Appellants have met their statutory burden of proof. 
IV. 
The requirement of notice presupposes the existence of an 
individual capable of giving it. Burgos v. City of New York, 742 
N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Green v. Village of Port Jer-
vis, 66 N.Y.S. 1042, 1043 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900). The maxim 
that the law does not compel people to do that which they can-
not possibly perform supports the principle that physical and/or 
mental inability to comply with a filing deadline may excuse 
the noncompliance. We have long held that courts have a pro-
tective duty towards infants: “The courts are bound to protect 
infants, who are their wards.” Valdimer v. Mount Vernon He-
brew Camps, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 283, 284 (N.Y. 1961). In Henry v. 
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City of New York, 724 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1999), we recently reaf-
firmed the special protections afforded infants under New York 
law: 
This Court has consistently recognized the special status that is ac-
corded an infant plaintiff by virtue of the infant’s tender age; that sta-
tus is not altered by the action or inaction of the infant’s parent or 
guardian. . . . ‘[I]t is the age and incapacity of the infant rather than 
the conduct of its parents and guardians which control.’ 
Id. at 374 (citation omitted). 
Nonetheless, § 50-e(5) “merely confers upon the courts the 
authority to entertain the otherwise untimely applications of 
disabled claimants; it does not, however, dictate that such ap-
plications automatically be granted.” Cohen v. Pearl River Un-
ion Free Sch. Dist., 414 N.E.2d 639, 645 (N.Y. 1980). 
In the instant case, the Second Department applied the 
wrong legal standard in requiring a “nexus” between claimant’s 
infancy and the delay in filing a notice of claim: “In this case, 
the 10-year delay in moving, in effect, for leave to serve a late 
notice of claim was not the product of the plaintiff’s infancy.” 
Williams, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 208. The Appellate Division’s error of 
law ignored the clear Legislative intent of the 1976 amendment 
to § 50-e(5) to eliminate the nexus requirement that infancy 
cause the delay: “Under the proposed new statute the court 
would be free to consider such disability as an element bearing 
upon the court’s determination even though the disability may 
not have been the reason for the failure to serve the late no-
tice.” Judicial Conf. Rep. on C.P.L.R., 1976 N.Y. Sess. Laws 
2089 (McKinney); Giblin v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 459 
N.E.2d 856, 858 (N.Y. 1984). In Beary v. City of Rye, 377 N.E.2d 
453, 455 (N.Y. 1978), this Court set forth, as an appendix to its 
opinion, the text of § 50-e(5) before and after the 1976 amend-
ment. The relevant language was underscored as follows: 
Pre-1976 
5. The court, in its discretion, may grant leave to serve a late notice of 
claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the time speci-
fied in subdivision one of this section in the following cases: (1) Where 
the claimant is an infant, or is mentally or physically incapacitated, 
and by reason of such disability fails to serve a notice of claim within 
the time specified . . . . 
 
Post-1976 
5. Application for leave to serve a late notice. Upon application, the 
court, in its discretion, may extend the time to serve a notice of claim 
specified in paragraph (a) of subdivision one. . . . In determining 
whether to grant the extension, the court shall consider, in particular, 
whether the public corporation . . . acquired actual knowledge of the 
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essential facts constituting the claim within the time frame specified 
or within a reasonable time thereafter. The court shall also consider 
all other relevant facts and circumstances, including: whether the 
claimant was an infant, or mentally or physically incapacitated . . . 
and whether the delay in serving the notice of claim substantially 
prejudiced the public corporation in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
Beary, 377 NE.2d at 455 (emphasis added). 
Even before the 1976 amendments, this Court recognized 
that the textual requirement of a causal connection between in-
fancy and the delay had been greatly eroded by judicial inter-
pretation. In Murray v. City of New York, 282 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 
1972), we held that it is presumed that infancy is linked to the 
failure to timely file a notice of claim. It does not have to be 
proven: 
An infant of 19 may indeed lack the acumen to appreciate the source, 
or for that matter, the nature of the wrong allegedly perpetrated 
against him and, consequently, have been remiss in the proper asser-
tion of his legal rights. The impediment may reasonably by presumed 
to attend infancy; there is no requirement that it be factually demon-
strated. 
Id. at 108 (citation omitted). As a result, the Second Depart-
ment’s nexus requirement is not only a misinterpretation of ex-
isting law, but would also remain an anachronism even if the 
Legislature had failed to repeal the “by reason of” language of 
pre-1976 § 50-e(5). In Kurz v. N. Y. City Health & Hospitals 
Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), the Second De-
partment itself recognized the Legislative abrogation of the 
nexus requirement: 
[T]here is no merit to the HHC’s contention that the petitioner has 
failed to make the requisite showing that the delay in filing a notice of 
claim was a product of the children’s infancy, and absent that show-
ing, leave to serve a late notice must be denied. This requirement ex-
isted under a predecessor version of current General Municipal Law § 
50-e(5). That predecessor section did indeed contain an express re-
quirement limiting a court’s discretion over late notice applications to 
situations, inter alia, “[w]here the claimant is an infant and by reason 
of such disability fails to serve a notice of claim within the time speci-
fied.” As amended, however, this requirement was deleted. A peti-
tioner is no longer required to establish that the delay is a product of 
the infancy. 
Id. at 534 (citations omitted). 
Despite its own precedent, and despite the fact that no 
other department weighs the lack of a causal nexus against the 
infant, see, e.g., Ali ex rel. Ali v. Bunny Realty Corp., 676 
N.Y.S.2d 166, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), the Second Depart-
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ment has repeatedly ruled that the absence of a nexus between 
infancy and the delay militates against granting leave to serve 
a late notice of claim. See Williams, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 208; Cotten 
v. County of Nassau, 763 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003); In re. Matarrese v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 633 
N.Y.S.2d, 837, 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Gandia v. N.Y.C. 
Hous. Auth., 571 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). The is-
sue is not whether there is a conflict between the Second De-
partment and other Departments within the Appellate Divi-
sion, but whether there is a conflict between the Second 
Department and the clear Legislative intent behind amended   
§ 50-e(5). Regarding amendments, this Court stated in People 
ex rel. Sheldon v. Board of Appeals of New York, 138 N.E. 416, 
420 (N.Y. 1923): “We must assume that the lawmaking body in-
tended to effect a material change in the existing law; other-
wise the legislation would be nugatory.” In effect, the Second 
Department has rendered the 1976 amendment nugatory re-
garding the infancy factor. 
Here, the Second Department found the County’s argu-
ment persuasive that if nothing other than the claimant’s in-
fancy is asserted to excuse the failure to serve a timely notice, 
the conclusion that the delay was not a product of infancy en-
tails the conclusion that there was no excuse for the delay. The 
County further averred that since no single factor among those 
listed in Subdivision 5 is necessarily dispositive, it is incumbent 
upon a court to consider all of the relevant facts and circums-
tances. The County concludes that it is, therefore, consistent 
with the statute to consider both whether the petitioner is an 
infant and whether the petitioner’s infancy caused—and thus 
provides a reasonable excuse for—the failure to serve a timely 
notice of claim. Nardi v. County of Nassau, 795 N.Y.S.2d 300, 
301 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Hendershot v. Westchester Med. Ctr., 
777 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). We find that by 
conflating the disability of infancy with the non-textual factor 
of reasonable excuse, the text and Legislative history of the 
1976 amendments are disregarded. It is, in effect, merely 
another thinly veiled attempt to maintain the repealed nexus 
requirement. 
Whether the claimant was an infant is a factor among all 
other facts and circumstances a court should consider in its re-
view of an application for leave to file a late notice of claim. The 
Second Department erred in applying the incorrect legal stan-
dard of a “nexus” requirement between infancy and the delay. 
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This requirement was expressly repealed by the legislature in 
1976 and should no longer be considered in a court’s exercise of 
its discretion. 
V. 
In Williams, 786 N.Y.S.2d. at 208, the Second Department 
applied the wrong legal standard by holding that the Plaintiff 
failed its burden of proof that the Defendant County would not 
be case specific. Imposing this burden of proof solely upon the 
claimant is unfair in the context of a late notice of claim be-
cause discovery is not available to the moving party prior to the 
application. The municipality is in a far better position to de-
termine whether witnesses are no longer available, memories 
have faded, or documentary evidence has been lost. In fact, the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the party 
with superior access to evidence should have the burden of 
coming forward with proof of prejudice. Campbell v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 85, 96 (1961) (holding that the State had bur-
den of proof when it enjoyed substantial advantages in access 
to information in robbery case). The County suggested that the 
applicable standard is comparable to the burden shifting para-
digm used in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–57 (1981), in the employment discrimi-
nation setting. The ultimate burden of proof on an application 
under Subdivision 5 always rests on the claimant. Id. at 252. 
When it comes to the issue of prejudice, the County has a bur-
den of production, or of coming forward with some basis for as-
serting prejudice. 
Although we recognize such precedent as controlling, 
access to evidence cannot be disregarded. The inquiry into 
whether substantial prejudice prevented the defendant munici-
pality from maintaining its defense on the merits is very fact 
dependent. Among other considerations, allocation of burden of 
production and persuasion may depend on which party—
plaintiff or defendant, petitioner or respondent—has made the 
affirmative allegation or presumably has peculiar means of 
knowledge. New York has followed the United States Supreme 
Court’s lead in adhering to the principle that the party with 
superior access to a fact, or superior access to evidence of that 
fact, should bear the burden of proof. See In re Louis Harris As-
soc. v. de Leon, 646 N.E.2d 438, 442 (N.Y. 1994) (placing the 
burden on the party with better access to information in a dis-
crimination case); Noseworthy v. City of New York, 80 N.E.2d 
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744, 746 (N.Y. 1948) (holding that, in a wrongful death case 
where plaintiff is deceased, a lesser evidentiary burden is 
placed on plaintiff because they cannot testify in court). 
Even under the County’s proposed rule for burden shifting, 
and as adopted by the Second Department, Appellant has met 
his initial burden of proving lack of prejudice. The matters of 
actual knowledge and substantial prejudice are closely linked. 
All four departments of the Appellate Division have held that 
the possession of medical records that gave actual knowledge of 
the essential facts negates prejudice from delay. See, In re. 
McMillan v. City of New York, 718 N.Y.S.2d 819, 819 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2001) (First Department holding: “respondents have 
been in possession of [Plaintiff’s] medical records since the time 
of the alleged malpractice, and, accordingly, have not been pre-
judiced by the delay.”); Dunne v. Grello, 579 N.Y.S.2d 707, 707 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (Second Department stating: “[i]nasmuch 
as the defendants in this case had actual knowledge of the es-
sential facts constituting the subject claim by virtue of their ex-
clusive possession of the pertinent medical records, they were 
not in any way prejudiced by the plaintiff’s delay in serving a 
notice of claim.”); Kavanaugh v. Mem’l Hosp. & Nursing Home, 
511 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (Third Department 
concluding: “given Memorial’s actual notice [from its possession 
of medical records], it is unlikely that any prejudice could be es-
tablished.”; Strobel v. County of Lewis, 537 N.Y.S.2d 707, 707 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Fourth Department holding: “[t]he hos-
pital has not shown any prejudice as a result of the delay and, 
given its actual notice [from its possession of medical records], 
it is unlikely that any prejudice could be established.”) 
The primacy of medical records is especially compelling in 
a case where contraindicated medical treatment is adminis-
tered to a patient. See Salzano v. Maestrantoneo, 699 N.Y.S.2d. 
45, 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (“the case involves defendants’ al-
leged malpractice in prescribing and administering contraindi-
cated medication to plaintiff and, as such, is not likely to turn 
on accounts of witnesses with dim memories of long ago 
events.”). Here, claims concern both a contraindicated vaginal 
delivery and a contraindicated drug (pitocin). Witness recollec-
tion is rarely dispositive in medical malpractice actions. See 
Leeds v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 775 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2004) (observing that “it appears that the trial will turn 
mainly on medical records rather than witnesses’ memories”); 
Noriega v. Presbyterian Hosp., 761 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (N.Y. App. 
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Div. 2003) (stating that “the case is likely to turn mainly on 
medical records rather than witnesses’ memories”). 
This Court finds that Appellant has met his initial burden 
of proof by proffering expert interpretation of the medical 
records of Tymeik William’s traumatic birth, records which 
were at all times within the possession and control of Respon-
dents. We further find that Respondents have failed their bur-
den of production of admissible evidence under the burden 
shifting rule. “An articulation not admitted into evidence will 
not suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden merely 
through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.” 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9; see also Ferrante v. Am. Lung 
Ass’n, 665 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (N.Y. 1997) (stating that, “to rebut 
the presumption of discrimination,” the employer must “clearly 
set[] forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, le-
gitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to sup-
port its employment decision”). Here, the attorney for the 
County offered only a bare assertion that Defendants’ were pre-
judiced because many of the doctors whose names appeared in 
the medical records were no longer employed at the hospital: 
The names of the following physicians have been identified from the 
Nassau County Medical Center records attached as exhibits to plain-
tiff’s moving papers: [Respondents proceed to list seventeen names]. 
Upon information and belief, the source of that information being 
personnel records maintained at the Nassau University Medical Cen-
ter as researched by the Department of Risk Management, of these 
seventeen physicians only two, Drs. Santana . . . and Carrasco, are 
still employed at the hospital. 
Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 5–6, A57–58. 
This statement was insufficient to show prejudice on three 
levels. First, no individual with personal knowledge of the hos-
pital records swore to the truth of the information. Cf. Shabazz 
v. Sheltering Arms Children’s Serv., 629 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1995) (finding no prejudice to the New York Housing 
Authority through “the mere fact that an employee who might 
have knowledge of the relevant circumstances had left the Au-
thority’s employ”). Second, the County did not demonstrate that 
the former employee physicians were, in fact, unavailable or 
even that Defendants made a good faith effort to locate them 
through state and national physician registries. See Caminero 
v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 800 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005) (finding that physician’s relocation out of state 
had not rendered him unavailable so as to prejudice hospital). 
In fact, the County itself used the New York State Department 
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of Health Physician Profile internet site to research the back-
ground of Appellant’s expert Dr. Shaiman. The County needed 
to show it could not communicate with the witnesses or that 
the witnesses would not cooperate with the County’s defense of 
the claim. Instead, the depositions of all three physicians 
present at claimant’s birth were taken during pendency of the 
appeal to the Appellate Division. Third, the County failed to 
show that the absence of testimony from the remaining fifteen 
doctors would substantially prejudice its defense on the merits, 
when the information contained in the medical records pro-
vided the facts and information needed to investigate the claim. 
See Medley v. Cichon, 761 N.Y.S.2d 666, 668 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003) (finding absence of substantial prejudice on similar 
facts).41 Because a plaintiff, on limited discovery, cannot hypo-
thesize all possible defenses and then be expected to show that 
the defendant municipality continues to have access to all ma-
terial witnesses, the Second Department itself has held that 
that the hospital’s burden of production should include a show-
ing that a meaningful line of defense has been foreclosed. See 
Romanian Am. Interests, Inc. v. Scher, 464 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding that because plaintiff’s attorney 
has a duty to prepare for affirmative defenses, the attorney 
bears the burden of proof of proving the affirmative defenses 
would succeed in an attorney malpractice case). Here, no such 
showing is forthcoming. 
In the instant case, the New York City Health and Hospit-
als Corporation argues as an amicus curiae that the nearly ten-
year delay in serving the notice of claim should be dispositive 
proof of prejudice. We find this assertion to be no more than 
unhappiness with either the Legislature’s failure to shorten the 
infancy toll for medical malpractice to less than ten years or 
with this Court’s ruling that the 1976 amendments to § 50-e(5) 
includes tolling periods. Cohen, 414 N.E.2d at 644. Appellant 
applied for leave to serve the late notice of claim before the ex-
piration of the time in which to seek such relief. The proper in-
quiry is, therefore, whether the delay substantially prejudiced 
the ability of the public corporation to defend on the merits and 
not an abstract inquiry into the length of the delay. 
The party asserting a defense of laches has the burden of 
                                                          
 41. In Medley, the medical records maintained by defendants indicated 
that during infant plaintiff’s birth his head and neck were stuck in his moth-
er’s perineum for about five minutes, following which he required resuscita-
tion and was born with an Apgar score of zero. 761 N.Y.S.2d at 667. 
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proving that the delay was prejudicial. Love v. Spector, 627 
N.Y.S.2d 87, 88–89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). The Second Depart-
ment has held: “[Respondent’s] conclusory allegations that it 
was prejudiced due to the mere passage of time was insufficient 
in light of the facts set out in the medical records and its failure 
to show what investigation, if any, it undertook.” In re Speed v. 
A. Holly Patterson Extended Care Facility, 781 N.Y.S.2d 135, 
136–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). Nonetheless, the Second De-
partment has inconsistently applied its own rule. In Seymour v. 
New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 370, 372 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005), the court concluded: “[t]he obvious pre-
judice that has been suffered by the appellant as a result of the 
10-year delay cannot be dismissed with a mere wave of the 
hand and the comment that the appellant has medical records 
in its possession.” (quoting In re. Matarrese v. N.Y.C. Health & 
Hosps. Corp., 633 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)). In 
denying a brain injured infant plaintiff leave to serve a late no-
tice, the Seymour court further admitted: “it is true that the de-
fendant did not allege that the relevant personnel involved in 
the prenatal care and delivery of the infant plaintiff were un-
available.” Id. at 372. 
Section 50-e(5) requires the notice of claim be served with-
in ninety days or a reasonable time thereafter. What is “rea-
sonable” is generally construed according to the facts and cir-
cumstances peculiar to the individual case. The Second 
Department summarized the applicable law in Kurz v. New 
York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d 533, 535 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991): 
Furthermore, we reject the HHC’s argument that it will be unduly 
prejudiced by being compelled to defend this case. While the instant 
delay was just short of 10 years, similar lengthy delays have been ex-
cused where the interest of justice so warranted . . . . Moreover, the 
HHC has been in possession of the children’s medical records since 
the time of the alleged malpractice and thus had actual notice of the 
claim and the underlying facts within the limitation period . . . . The 
HHC should thus not be heard to complain of prejudice based upon its 
purely speculative argument. 
In Spaulding v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 
620 N.Y.S.2d 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the First Department 
held that defendant’s possession of medical records gave actual 
notice of the facts underlying infant plaintiff’s claim of brain 
damage resulting from defendant’s obstetrical malpractice. The 
court further found that given the “knowledge and resultant 
lack of prejudice, the almost 10 year delay in serving a notice of 
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claim should not be fatal.” Id. at 53. 
This Court finds that Appellants have made the requisite 
showing of lack of substantial prejudice based on the extensive 
paper trail of medical records within the County’s possession, 
which at any time would have allowed investigation of the facts 
constituting the claim. We have previously held in In re Diaz 
Chem. Corp. v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 670 
N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1998), that the party protesting the de-
lay must show substantial actual prejudice. We find that Res-
pondents have failed their burden of production of admissible 
evidence in this regard. 
VI. 
Although the Judicial Conference refers to whether the ap-
plicant has a reasonable excuse for serving the late notice of 
claim, the text of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) does not ex-
pressly enumerate the factor. Judicial Conf. Rep. on C.P.L.R., 
1976 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2089, 2089–90 (McKinney). This stands 
in contrast to the first discretionary consideration set forth in 
the Court of Claims Act § 10(6) (McKinney 2009): “whether the 
delay in filing the claim was excusable.” Nonetheless, numer-
ous courts have considered the existence of reasonable excuse 
in construing § 50-e(5). See, e.g., Medley, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 668; 
Matarrese, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 838. 
In the instant case, both the trial court and the Appellate 
Division found that Appellant failed to offer a reasonable 
excuse for the delay. Williams, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 208. Ms. Fow-
ler, the infant plaintiff’s mother, offered two excuses: first, that 
she learned only years later that her son’s seizures and deve-
lopmental disorders were a result of brain injury from medical 
malpractice during labor and delivery and, second, that she 
was unaware of the notice of claim requirement as a condition 
precedent to suit against the municipal corporation. Pl.-
Appellant’s Br. 22, A53a–53b. Although both are likely true, 
neither is legally sufficient to “excuse” a notice of claim served 
nearly ten years after accrual. In re Magnotti v. City of New 
York, 614 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding ig-
norance of the notice requirement is not a sufficient excuse for 
failure to serve a timely notice of claim); accord In re Gaffney v. 
Town of Hempstead, 641 N.Y.S.2d 709, 710 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996). Appellant’s excuses join a list of believable yet insuffi-
cient explanations for such a delay. See In re Drozdzal v. Rens-
selaer City Sch. Dist., 716 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000) (finding petitioner’s excuse that she was too preoccupied 
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with the child’s problems and was not aware of the condition 
precedent unpersuasive); Copeland v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 575 
N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (law office failure not rea-
sonable excuse); Taverna v. City of New York, 560 N.Y.S.2d 775 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (plaintiff’s inability to speak English in-
sufficient excuse). 
Appellant further affirmed that a reasonable excuse for the 
late filing existed based upon his infancy and intellectual han-
dicap and asked to be accorded the protections traditionally ex-
tended to infants and incompetents by the New York State 
courts. Pl.-Appellant’s Br. 30–31 (citing Pl. Aff. 9–10, which 
cites Trejo v. City of New York, 548 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1989); In re Potter v. Bd. of Educ., 350 N.Y.S.2d 671, 
673–74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)). We find this argument unavail-
ing. Section 50-e(5) lists infancy among “all other relevant facts 
and circumstances” to be considered by a court acting in its dis-
cretion whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim. 
The Legislature could have easily provided in the 1976 
amendments that minority expressly excuses strict compliance 
with the timely notice requirement, but instead made no such 
exception. A court would be hard pressed to find a more sympa-
thetic applicant than Tymeik Williams. Nonetheless, short of 
engrafting a judicial exception, the matter of reasonable excuse 
must be resolved by reference to the statute, no matter how 
unappealing the result may be: “[c]ourts, it is submitted, are 
not free to devise their own rules in a statutory field merely be-
cause their sense of justice impels them nor do courts sit as 
councils of revision on the legislative product.” In re Flannery v. 
State, 399 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1977). 
In Medley, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 668, the Second Department 
stated: 
Finally, we note that the existence or absence of a reasonable excuse 
for any delay is but one of the factors to consider. If there is timely no-
tice and the absence of prejudice, even the absence of a reasonable 
excuse for failing to timely serve a notice of claim will not bar the 
granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim. Under the circums-
tances of this case, even were we to agree with the defendants that 
the plaintiffs’ excuse for failing to timely serve a notice of claim was 
unreasonable, that is merely a factor to be considered and would not 
alone bar the granting of leave. 
Every other department of the Appellate Division has also 
recognized that a reasonable excuse is not mandatory for a suc-
cessful application for leave to serve a late notice. In fact, they 
have all ruled that leave can be granted if other factors out-
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weigh the unreasonable excuse. In re Porcaro v. City of New 
York, 799 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (First De-
partment stating “the presence or absence of any one of the 
foregoing factors is not determinative . . . and the absence of a 
reasonable excuse is not, standing alone, fatal to the applica-
tion”); Drozdzal, 716 N.Y.S.2d at 436 (Third Department hold-
ing “the failure to offer a reasonable excuse for the delay in fil-
ing a notice of claim is not fatal where, as here, actual notice 
was had and there is no compelling showing of prejudice to res-
pondents”); Love v. City of Auburn, 721 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2001) (Fourth Department stating “[t]he presence or 
absence of any one of the numerous relevant factors the court 
must consider is not determinative . . . and thus plaintiffs’ fail-
ure to offer any excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of 
claim is not fatal”). 
This Court affirms the Appellate Division’s finding that 
Appellant lacked a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving 
the late notice of claim nearly ten years after accrual. However, 
in light of timely notice and the absence of prejudice, this defect 
is not fatal to Appellant’s application. 
VII. 
This Court finds that the Appellate Division abused its dis-
cretion in applying the wrong legal standards as follows: (1) in-
correctly finding that detailed contemporaneous medical 
records at all times in Respondent’s possession failed to give 
them actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim; (2) 
incorrectly requiring a nexus between infancy and the late no-
tice of claim; (3) incorrectly placing the burden of proof that the 
municipality was not substantially prejudiced by the delay ex-
clusively on the Appellant; (4) incorrectly finding that Appel-
lant’s unreasonable excuse was fatal to his motion; and (5) fail-
ing to recognize that, as a matter of public policy, the 
discretionary factors of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) should 
be liberally construed in favor of a physically and mentally dis-
abled infant applicant whose legal rights depend solely on the 
action or inaction of third parties. 
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Appellate Division 
on the law and as a matter of public policy. Appellant’s applica-
tion for leave to serve a late notice of claim is hereby granted 
pursuant to the order of the trial court, and the matter is re-
manded for further proceedings in accordance with this opi-
nion. 
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Notice of claim provisions are a vestige of the ancient Eng-
lish common law principle that the King can do no harm.42 Its 
practicalities were such that the English King enjoyed com-
plete, personal immunity and that no court could obtain juris-
diction over him without his consent.43 The United States Su-
preme Court adopted the sovereign immunity doctrine in Cohen 
v. Virginia, with Chief Justice Marshall finding that the doc-
trine was “universally received” and explaining “that the Unit-
ed States cannot be sued . . . [b]ecause it is incompatible with 
their sovereignty. The States, before the adoption of the federal 
constitution, were also sovereign; and the same principle ap-
plies, unless it can be shown that they have surrendered this 
attribute of sovereignty.”44 The doctrine has slowly eroded over 
time due to concerns that the insurmountable barrier creates 
harsh results and poses a threat to an injured citizen’s legiti-
mate claim against the state. The California Supreme Court re-
ferred to sovereign immunity as “an anachronism, without ra-
tional basis, [which] has existed only by the force of inertia.”45 
Colorado’s highest court has opined that sovereign immunity 
“may be a proper subject for discussion by students of mytholo-
gy but finds no haven or refuge in this Court.”46 The Florida 
Supreme Court suggested that disapproval of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was one reason that the Declaration of In-
dependence was created and the Revolutionary War occurred, 
and the court further argued that the doctrine was “anachro-
nistic not only to our system of justice but to our tradition con-
cepts of democratic government.”47 Washington’s highest court 
simply declared, “[w]e closed our courtroom doors without legis-
lative help, and we can likewise open them.”48 
                                                          
 42. Edwin Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 
(1924). 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 308, 411 (1821). 
 45. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 460 (Cal. 1961) (en 
banc). 
 46. Colo. Racing Comm’n. v. Brush Racing Ass’n., 316 P.2d 582, 585 (Colo. 
1957) (en banc). 
 47. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957). 
 48. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (Wash. 
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Abrogation of sovereign immunity has only been partial, 
however, with notice of claim provisions remaining a substan-
tial bar to otherwise meritorious suits. It is patently difficult to 
review, investigate, and serve a notice of claim within the New 
York statutory ninety days, especially if one has not had time 
to retain an attorney.49 The degree of difficulty in meeting the 
condition precedent increases when the claimant is an infant. 
Despite the protected status of infants under tort law, constitu-
tional challenges to statutes requiring strict compliance of mi-
nors to notice of claim provisions have been reviewed under the 
rational basis test with predictable results.50 Infants have been 
found to possess no fundamental right to sue the government, 
nor are they a suspect class.51 Nevertheless, both equal protec-
tion52 and due process challenges53 have generally failed. It is 
not unconstitutional to require infants to comply with notice of 
claim provisions.54 
To hold it inessential to file a notice of claim would render 
the underlying statute nugatory—a meaningless, purposeless 
legislative gesture. The claimant could simply serve a notice of 
claim whenever they chose to do so. Not so, say courts adopting 
the majority position of strict compliance. The majority ap-
proach holds that the right to sue a political subdivision is sole-
                                                          
1953) (en banc). 
 49. Daniel Kramer, Torts, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 737, 739 (1991) (discuss-
ing important decisions in 1990 tort cases and their effects). 
 50. J. James Frasier III, A Review of Issues Presented by § 11-46-11 of the 
Mississippi Tort Claims Act: The Notice Provisions and Statute of Limitations, 
65 MISS. L.J. 643, 713 (1996) (discussing Mississippi’s notice of claim and sta-
tute of limitations provisions and assessing similar provisions and case law in 
other states). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Langevin v. City of Biddeford, 481 A.2d 495, 497–98 (Me. 
1984) (requiring minor claimants to comply with the notice requirements was 
rationally related to the state’s interests in avoiding stale claims, reducing lit-
igation costs and fostering out-of-court settlements); But cf. Scott v. Sch. Bd., 
568 P.2d 746, 747–48 (Utah 1977) (statute which did not expressly exempt 
minors from its requirements violated due process and equal protection rights 
of persons who had no standing to sue in their own behalf, and whose parents 
had no legal duty to sue for them). 
 53. See, e.g., Ocampo v. City of Racine, 137 N.W.2d 477, 480–81 (Wis. 
1965) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that notice of claim requirement violated 
her due process rights since it predicated her suit on an act which she was un-
able to perform and reasoning that since the notice requirement could be ful-
filled by a parent or guardian on behalf of the infant claimant, it was not an 
unreasonable restriction on the minor’s legal rights). 
 54. Frasier, supra note 50, at 713. 
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ly a statutory right that requires strict compliance with any 
legislative prerequisites.55 The express statutory requirement 
of a written notice of claim is not satisfied by anything less 
than presentment of such. Only two jurisdictions, Minnesota 
and New York, have held that actual notice of an incident may 
sometimes avoid the trap that statutory notice of claim re-
quirements pose for unwary claimants.56 
Courts adopting the minority position that infancy per se is 
a proper basis for relief from limitations placed on filing medi-
cal malpractice claims adhere to the principle that conditioning 
a minor’s legal rights on an act that she is legally, physically, or 
intellectually incapable of performing is inherently unreasona-
ble.57 It is patently unfair and poor public policy to require the 
infant plaintiff to rely on parents or guardians who may lack 
concern, knowledge, or timeliness in their actions.58 The minor-
ity position espouses that it is inequitable to require persons 
who lack the physical, mental, or emotional skills to drive an 
automobile to file a notice of claim within the prescribed period 
or forever lose their right to recover for their injuries.59 Sta-
tutes which require minors to strictly comply with conditions 
precedent to the commencement of a lawsuit hurt infants and 
protect potentially negligent physicians, health care providers, 
and hospitals, increasing societal harm.60 Not surprisingly, 
                                                          
 55. E.g., Goncalves v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 332 P.2d 713, 715 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1958) (reasoning that the right to sue local government is purely sta-
tutory, which the legislature has the power to restrict). 
 56. Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30, 32–33 (Minn. 1979) (adopting a 
substantial rather than strict compliance approach to notice of claim require-
ment); Matey v. Bethlehem Cent. Sch. Dist., 391 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358, 360 (N.Y. 
Special Term 1977) (finding that infant petitioner injured on trampoline dur-
ing gym class satisfied notice requirement of § 50-e(5) when his parents wrote 
a letter to the school district superintendant regarding the nature of accident 
and injuries within ninety days of accrual and when they timely met with 
school district’s insurance representatives regarding compensation for ex-
penses above and beyond infant’s health insurance offsets in an effort to pre-
vent litigation). 
 57. See DeVries, supra note 32, at 422–23, 446 (pointing out several prob-
lems with requiring minors to comply with the statute of limitations such as 
the difficulty minors have acquiring a competent attorney and further stating 
that minors “cannot be expected to know that such a thing as a lawsuit even 
exists nor how to pursue it”). See also Jennifer Chow, Civil Practice Law and 
Rules, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 675, 677 (1995). 
 58. DeVries, supra note 32, at 423. 
 59. See id. at 446. 
 60. See id. at 446. 
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courts holding that minority status is an exemption from com-
pliance with notice of claim provisions have generally found 
statutes containing no such express exception unconstitution-
al.61 
New York has traditionally adopted the majority position 
of strict compliance with statutory notice of claim provisions. 
Prior to 1976, the grounds upon which a court might allow ser-
vice of a late notice of claim were narrow and were narrowly 
construed. Courts had no general discretion to permit a late fil-
ing. This changed with the 1976 amendments to § 50–e(5), 
which listed statutory factors that a court could consider, to-
gether with all other relevant facts and circumstances, in act-
ing in its discretion whether to grant an application to serve a 
late notice.62 Also eliminated was the “by reason of” language 
that required a nexus between infancy and the delay.63 A court 
could now consider simply “whether the claimant was an in-
fant, or mentally or physically incapacitated.”64 The expanded 
judicial discretion granted under the 1976 amendments came 
with a cutoff—a court cannot extend the time in which to serve 
a late notice beyond the applicable time in which to commence 
the action.65 The court of appeals held in Cohen that the time in 
which to seek leave to serve a late notice of claim is tolled by 
infancy for a period not to exceed ten years.66 
Despite these softening doctrines, New York claimants are 
still vulnerable to the paradox of a municipality escaping liabil-
ity if the injuries suffered by the individual are so catastrophic 
such as to make it impossible to comply with the terms of the 
notice of claim statute within the requisite time period. This is 
                                                          
 61. Schumer v. City of Perryville, 667 S.W.2d 414, 415–416, 418 (Mo. 
1984) (finding minor’s due process rights violated by conditioning the exercise 
of his valid cause of action on an act which he was legally powerless to per-
form); Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879, 882–83 (Nev. 1973) (holding arbitrary 
division of class along the lines of governmental versus private torts violated 
equal protection because it was without rational relation to the historical pur-
pose of notice of claim statutes); McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482 S.W.2d 151, 
153–54 (Tex. 1972) (stating that minors of tender years have long been exempt 
from complying with notice of claim statutes under the principle that such 
provisions are not to be enforced against persons incapable of comprehending 
and complying with them). 
 62. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(5) (McKinney 2007) (amended 2010). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Graziano, supra note 29, at 362. 
 66. See Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free Sch. Dist., 414 N.E.2d 639, 640 
(N.Y. 1980) (citing Graziano, supra note 29, at 370). 
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precisely the inapposite result the New York Court of Appeals 
handed down in Williams.67 Courts have been reluctant to en-
graft a judicial exception to the notice of claim requirement of § 
50-e(5) even for the most vulnerable subclass of plaintiffs—
infants suffering mental and physical disability due to birth 
trauma, the full manifestations of which are not apparent until 
developmental milestones are reached years later. Until a fu-
ture legislative amendment corrects this injustice, it is of criti-
cal importance to get Williams and other similar cases right. 
Unfortunately, the tragedy of the Williams holding is not 
Tymeik Williams’ alone to bear. The flawed reasoning, based 
upon mistakes of law, has been perpetuated in a string of re-
cent cases from the Second Department, all similarly denying 
vulnerable infant plaintiffs their day in court. In Rios, even 
though the notice was only thirteen months late, leave was de-
nied because the delay was not the product of the plaintiff’s in-
fancy and medical records did not give defendants actual know-
ledge of the facts surrounding the claim of negligent birth 
trauma.68 In Bucknor, birth trauma from a delay in performing 
a C-section caused the infant to develop autism and a pervasive 
developmental disorder.69 In denying leave to serve a late no-
tice almost ten years after alleged malpractice, the court con-
cluded that the delay was not directly attributable to the plain-
tiff’s infancy.70 Contemporaneous medical records continually 
in the possession and control of defendants gave “scant reason 
to identify or predict any lasting harm to the child, let alone a 
developmental disorder.”71 In King, plaintiff’s request to serve a 
late notice of claim seven years after the cause of action for neg-
ligent birth trauma arose was denied because the delay was not 
“the product of the infant petitioner’s infancy or the need to 
provide him with extraordinary care.”72 In Rowe, petition to 
serve a late notice was denied because the delay was not the 
                                                          
 67. See Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 847 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 
2006). 
 68. Rios v. Westchester County Healthcare Corp., 821 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 69. Bucknor v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 844 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2007). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 103. 
 72. In re King v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 840 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612–13 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
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product of claimant’s infancy, there was no reasonable excuse 
for the delay, and, even if defendants possessed the pertinent 
medical records, plaintiff failed to establish that the corpora-
tion would not be substantially prejudiced by the delay.73 In Ali, 
petitioner was not entitled to serve a late notice of claim be-
cause the nine-year delay was not directly attributable to his 
infancy, and plaintiff failed to prove that the hospital had not 
been substantially prejudiced in maintaining its defenses on 
the merits.74 Finally, in Gonzalez, application for leave to serve 
late notice of claim was denied because the hospital’s posses-
sion of medical records did not establish actual knowledge of 
the facts constituting the claim of failure to diagnose hypoto-
nia75 and hip dysplasia, no reasonable excuse was offered, and 
the delay could not be attributed to claimant’s infancy.76 
There exists an exception. In 2007, a year after the final 
Williams appeal, the Second Department affirmed the grant of 
leave to serve a late notice of claim for an infant suffering  se-
vere brain damage during delivery.77 The court reasoned that 
the medical records possessed by the hospital “documented  her 
injuries at birth, the care given to her, the procedures per-
formed, and the time of the alleged malpractice.”78 Thus  the 
defendants “had actual notice of the essential facts underlying 
the claim.”79 The infant also provided a reasonable excuse for 
the delay.80 
More recently, the New York Court of Appeals reconsi-
dered the issue of discretionary leave to grant a § 50–e(5) late 
notice of claim in the context of a pediatric lead poisoning 
claim.81 In Pearson, infant patient’s mother brought a medical 
malpractice action against a New York City hospital alleging, 
inter alia, that defendant failed to perform a risk assessment or 
                                                          
 73. Rowe v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 871 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008). 
 74. In re Ali v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 877 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222–23 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 75. Medical condition of diminished muscle tone. BLAKISTON’S GOULD 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 652 (4th ed. 1979). 
 76. In re Gonzalez v. City of New York, 876 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2009). 
 77. In re Corvera v. Nassau County Health Care Corp., 833 N.Y.S.2d 537, 
537 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
 78. Id. at 538. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Pearson v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 889 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 2008). 
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provide anticipatory guidance for lead poisoning.82 The Court of 
Appeals, in affirming the order of the First Department en 
banc, agreed that leave to serve a notice of claim six months 
late was properly granted.83 In its short memorandum order, 
the Court of Appeals referred to the more substantial First De-
partment decision.84 The appellate division held that: 
‘The statute [General Municipal Law § 50–e(5)] contains a nonex-
haustive list of factors that the court should weigh, and compels con-
sideration of all relevant facts and circumstances. This approach pro-
vides flexibility for the courts and requires them to exercise 
discretion.’ Since the statute is remedial in nature, it should be liber-
ally construed. 
  The motion court properly took into account the pertinent statuto-
ry considerations, ‘including the simple fact of infancy’, that it would 
be ‘unfair and unjust’ to deprive the infant of a remedy based on her 
mother’s ignorance of the law, and defendant’s possession of medical 
records affording it actual knowledge of the essential facts constitut-
ing the claim that it negligently failed to perform a risk assessment or 
provide anticipatory guidance for lead poisoning, and the consequent 
absence of prejudice, stemming from the late notice, to its ability to 
defend against the claim.85 
The court specifically noted that there was evidence in the 
record that elevated levels of lead in the infant plaintiff’s blood 
were known to cause brain damage and affect neuropsychiatric 
development.86 The court also concluded that the extent of such 
injury could not be fully evaluated until the child is at least 
seven years old.87 It is this recognition, that the true impact of 
the injury was delayed and not readily apparent until later de-
velopmental milestones, that distinguishes Pearson from Wil-
liams. As a result of this epiphany, the First Department, as 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, granted plaintiff’s motion to 
voluntarily discontinue the lawsuit without prejudice pursuant 
to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3217(c),88 with leave to renew when the minor 
                                                          
 82. Pearson v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 840 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2007). 
 83. Pearson, 889 N.E.2d at 493. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Pearson, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 27 (citations omitted). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3217 (McKinney 2005) (stating in pertinent part in re-
gards to voluntary discontinuance “(b) By order of court. . . . an action shall 
not be discontinued by a party asserting a claim except upon order of the court 
and upon terms and conditions, as the court deems proper. . . . (c) Effect of dis-
continuance. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, stipulation or order of dis-
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was eight years old and the full extent of the injuries were de-
terminate.89 
The other striking feature of Pearson is the substantial 
compliance approach used by the court to construe the notice of 
claim requirement: 
While the dissent asserts that defendant was prejudiced by plaintiff’s 
delay in seeking to serve a late notice of claim until almost two years 
after the infant’s last appointment at Harlem Hospital, it neglects to 
note that plaintiff served a notice of claim, albeit without leave of 
court . . . just over six months after her daughter’s last appoint-
ment.90 
The significance was not lost on the dissent: “[i]t is well 
settled, however, that a late notice of claim served without 
leave of court is a nullity.”91 
The New York Court of Appeals took a step in the right di-
rection in Pearson. Whether the impact of the case as stare de-
cisis extends beyond the narrow context of infant lead poison-
ing is unclear at present. The dissent in the First Department’s 
opinion raised the omnipresent specter of Williams: “[t]ellingly, 
the majority does not address the above-quoted language from 
Williams regarding the insufficiency of the mere creation and 
retention of medical records to establish the knowledge of a de-
fendant of the essential facts of a claim.”92 
It is our sincere hope that this review will lead to a critical 
reexamination of the New York Court of Appeals decision in 
Williams, as well as to an increased awareness of the uniquely 
vulnerable status of infant plaintiffs under the technical statu-
tory rules for timely service of notice of claims. Short of a judi-
cially engrafted exception, the ultimate correction of this injus-
tice will fall on the legislature to further amend the current, 







                                                          
continuance, the discontinuance is without prejudice . . . .”). 
 89. 840 N.Y.S.2d at 27. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 29 (citing Mack v. City of New York, 696 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999)). 
 92. Id. 
